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Digest:  In re Jose C. 
Megan Krebbeks 
Opinion by Werdegar, J., with George, C.J., Kennard, J., 
Baxter, J., Chin, J., Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J. 
Issue 
Whether the supremacy clause of the United States 
Constitution, 18 U.S.C. § 3231, or any other provision of federal 
law, preempts California Welfare and Institutions Code section 
602. 
Facts 
Federal agents arrested plaintiff Jose C., a minor, after 
observing plaintiff leading six other persons through the 
California desert just across the Mexican border.1  After the 
federal agents transferred plaintiff to state custody, the Imperial 
County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition under 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (section 602), alleging 
a violation of federal immigration law.2  Section 602 gives 
California state courts jurisdiction to declare a juvenile who 
“violates any law of this state or of the United States . . . to be a 
ward of the court.”3  Though the federal courts have “original 
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses 
against the laws of the United States,”4 section 602 enables state 
courts to address juvenile violations of federal immigration law.  
At trial, plaintiff’s counsel objected on the grounds that the 
juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the federal 
criminal violations.5  The juvenile court overruled the objection 
and declared plaintiff to be a ward of the court, found him guilty 
of a felony, and sentenced him to a maximum of ten years 
confinement.6  The court of appeal affirmed plaintiff’s conviction.7  
The Supreme Court of California granted review to determine 
 1 In re Jose C., 198 P.3d 1087, 1091 (Cal. 2009). 
 2 Id. 
 3 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602(a) (West 2008). 
 4 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2006). 
 5 Jose C., 198 P.3d at 1091–92. 
 6 Id. at 1092. 
 7 Id. 
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whether section 602 gives a state court jurisdiction to declare a 
juvenile a ward of the court based on violations of federal law.8 
Analysis 
In a unanimous opinion, affirming the court of appeal, the 
Supreme Court of California observed that section 3231 
establishes two general principles.  First, federal district courts 
may exercise jurisdiction over federal criminal offenses; and 
second, state courts may not directly prosecute violations of 
federal criminal statutes.9  Plaintiff contended that section 3231 
went a step further and argued that section 3231 prohibited state 
courts from “interpreting and adjudicating in any proceeding 
whether a federal criminal statute has been violated.”10  
Plaintiff’s interpretation of section 3231 would have preempted 
state court jurisdiction over his case.11  The court was not 
persuaded by this argument and held that the juvenile wardship 
proceedings did not violate section 3231’s grant of exclusive 
jurisdiction to the federal courts and so were not preempted by 
section 3231.12  The court found that the state court’s 
interpretation and application of federal law posed no threat to 
federal interests because state courts were bound by federal 
precedent and their interpretations would be subject to direct 
review by the United States Supreme Court.13 
The court also acknowledged the interplay between state and 
federal law enforcement and judicial proceedings: 
Congress may pass a law barring a particular act and imposing a 
specific punishment, and a state legislature may pass a state law 
barring the same act and imposing a different specific punishment, as 
well as vesting jurisdiction over violations of the state law in its state 
courts, without encroaching upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
federal courts to adjudicate violations of the federal law and impose 
the federal punishment.14 
Plaintiff also argued that the state court adjudication of a 
federal immigration offense is preempted as an infringement of 
Congress’ exclusive power to regulate immigration.15  The court 
found this argument unconvincing.  The court noted that federal 
criminal law relating to the jurisdiction of immigration matters 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 1093. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 1094–95. 
 15 Id. at 1096. 
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makes no mention of state courts.16  While Congress expressly 
vested jurisdiction in the federal courts, the “absence of an 
express exclusion of state court jurisdiction ‘is strong, and 
arguably sufficient, evidence that Congress had no such intent’” 
to preempt state court jurisdiction regarding immigration 
matters.17 
Next, the court analyzed the four ways in which Congress 
may preempt state law: express, conflict, obstacle, and field 
preemption.18  In this situation, the court explained, the issue 
was one of field and obstacle preemption.19  Field preemption 
occurs where Congress intends to preempt all state law in a 
particular area by fully enacting comprehensive federal 
regulations, thus leaving no space for state regulation.20  
Obstacle preemption exists where the challenged state law is an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of purposes and 
objectives of Congress.21  The court found no intent by Congress 
to fully occupy the field of immigration law and thus preempt 
state regulations.22  Similarly, the court found no evidence that 
section 602 stood as an obstacle to federal objectives and 
purposes.23  Instead, it found that section 602 mirrored federal 
objectives and furthered a legitimate state interest.24 
Holding 
The court held that section 3231 and the exclusive federal 
authority over immigration matters did not preempt the state 
wardship proceedings that declared plaintiff a ward of the 
court.25 
Legal Significance 
This case affirms the state’s power and authority to conduct 
juvenile wardship proceedings even in instances where violations 
of federal criminal law are implicated.  In doing so, it allows 
California to retain some control over immigration matters 
within its territory. 
 
 16 Id. at 1097.  See also 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (2006). 
 17 Jose C., 198 P.3d at 1097 (quoting Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 
U.S. 820, 823 (1990)). 
 18 Id. at 1098–1101. 
 19 Id. at 1098. 
 20 Id. at 1099. 
 21 Id. at 1100. 
 22 Id. at 1098–99. 
 23 Id. at 1100–01. 
 24 Id. at 1101. 
 25 Id. at 1091. 
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